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Compensating Post-Conception Prenatal Medical Malpractice
While Respecting Life: A Recommendation to North Carolina
Legislators
INTRODUCTION
I don't care if it's a boy or a girl, as long as it's healthy. It is the
mantra of almost all expectant parents. The statement explicitly
expresses the hope for a healthy child and implicitly expresses the
desire not to bear a child with birth defects or disease. Modern
medicine allows parents to test themselves before conception for
genetic problems that could cause defects and to test the fetus after
conception for potential or actual defects.1 Approximately 3% to 5%
of all fetuses will be affected by a birth defect or serious malforma-
tion.2 These defects and disorders account for approximately 30% of
infant deaths, and those infants who survive usually face long-term
health problems.3
With the advent of prenatal diagnostic procedures came the inevi-
table entanglement with abortion rights after Roe v. Wade.4 As these
diagnostic procedures became more reliable after the mid-1960s, they
became an accepted component of prenatal medical care.5
The most common method of prenatal screening is amnio-
centesis.6 This can be used to detect defects at approximately sixteen
weeks gestation by examining amniotic fluid.7 The results arrive in
three to four weeks, with only 5% of the tests revealing an abnormal-
ity8 such as Down syndrome. 9 Analysis of the amniotic fluid that
1. Wylie Burke & Ron L. Zimmern, Ensuring the Appropriate Use of Genetic Tests,
5 NATURE REviEws GENETICS 955, 956 (2004).
2. Anthony Johnson, New First Trimester Screening Test Can Provide Mothers
Reassurance, More Options, NEws 14 CAROLINA, Jan. 12, 2004, http://rdu.news14.com/
content/headlines/?ArID=41457&SeclD=2.
3. Id.
4. JUDITH A. Boss, THE BIRTH LOTrERY 18 (1993); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (establishing that the right to privacy includes the right to obtain an abortion,
but that states may limit this right after the second trimester to protect the mother's
health).
5. Boss, supra, note 4, at 18.
6. Id. at 45.
7. Id. at 46.
8. Id. at 48.
9. Down syndrome is a disorder that usually includes multiple defects, including:
mental retardation, characteristic physical features, heart defects, vision problems,
1
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shows an elevated alphafetoprotein level indicates a neural tube
defect' ° such as spina bifida. 1" Amniocentesis, like the other forms of
testing, is frequently used in conjunction with ultrasound, which can
reveal physical defects, such as skeletal abnormalities or
anencephaly. 12 When used with ultrasound, amniocentesis is 99.5%
accurate in diagnosing defects. 13
Newer techniques include chorionic villus sampling ("CVS") and
recombinant DNA analysis. 4 CVS can be performed much earlier in
the pregnancy than amniocentesis and yields quicker results, but it is
not as accurate and cannot be used to diagnose neural tube defects.
15
Recombinant DNA analysis is not considered extremely reliable, but it
is helpful in diagnosing some of the more serious conditions. 6
Severe, fatal defects can often be diagnosed through prenatal
genetic screening.17 These defects include Tay-Sachs disease,' 8 Lesch-
Nyhan syndrome,' 9 Menkes disease,2 ° and anencephaly. 2 ' Women are
faced with the choice of terminating the pregnancy or carrying the
increased infections, and, in children, an increased risk of thyroid problems and
leukemia. See March of Dimes, Professionals' & Researchers' Quick References and
Fact Sheets, http://www.marchofdimes.com/professionals/14332_1214.asp (last
visited Mar. 9, 2007).
10. Boss, supra note 4, at 48.
11. Spina bifida is a neural tube defect that affects the spine and spinal cord,
potentially causing paralysis, hydrocephalus, learning disabilities, and bowel and
bladder problems. See National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, NINDS
Spina Bifida Information Page, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/spina bifida/
spinabifida.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
12. Boss, supra note 4, at 46, 65.
13. Id. at 48.
14. Id. at 51, 57.
15. Id. at 51, 53-54.
16. Id. at 57-59 (e.g., cystic fibrosis, neurofibrosis, Huntington disease, or
Duchenne muscular dystrophy).
17. See generally id. at 30-44 (discussing various diagnoses possible).
18. Tay-Sachs disease is caused by the lack of an enzyme necessary for breaking
down fatty substances in brain and nerve cells. This destroys the central nervous
system, and the child becomes blind, deaf, unable to swallow, and paralyzed. The
disease usually causes death by age four. See National Institute of Neurological
Disorders and Stroke, NINDS Tay-Sachs Disease Information Page, http://
www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/taysachs/taysachs.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
19. Lesch-Nyhan syndrome is caused by an enzyme deficiency that causes an
excess accumulation of uric acid in the body, leading to severe gout, poor muscle
control, moderate retardation, and involuntary body movements similar to
Huntington's disease. Death occurs due to renal failure early in life. See National
Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, NINDS Lesch-Nyhan Syndrome
Information Page, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/leschnyhan/leschnyhan.
htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
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fetus to term knowing it will have a short life expectancy. Researchers
have found that women are more likely to terminate the pregnancy
when the fetus is diagnosed as having one of these severe or fatal
defects. 22 Some diseases, such as Tay-Sachs or Lesch-Nyhan, are so
devastating and cause such suffering that there is comparatively little
controversy surrounding the testing and termination of afflicted
fetuses.23
Physicians who counsel expectant parents and perform genetic
screening tests have an obligation to inform the parents of all pertinent
information, test results, and options available to them.24 Unfortu-
nately, parents do not always receive the information they need to
make a choice about whether to become pregnant or continue their
20. Menkes Disease is caused by a genetic defect that disrupts the metabolism of
copper in the body, resulting in severe developmental delays, seizures, and the loss of
any skills the infant acquired in the first two to three months of life. Infants fail to
physically develop, have neurodegeneration in the gray matter of the brain, and fragile
arteries. Infants die before age ten. See National Institute of Neurological Disorders
and Stroke, NINDS Menkes Disease Information Page, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/
disorders/menkes/menkes.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
21. The neural tube should close between the third and fourth weeks of pregnancy
to form the brain and spinal cord of the embryo. Anencephaly occurs when the
cephalic end of the neural tube fails to close, which results in the lack of a major
portion of the brain, skull, and scalp. "Infants with this disorder are born without a
forebrain ... and a cerebrum (the thinking and coordinating part of the brain). The
remaining brain tissue is often exposed - not covered by bone or skin. A baby born
with anencephaly is usually blind, deaf, unconscious, and unable to feel pain."
National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, NINDS Anencephaly
Information Page, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/anencephaly/anencephaly.
htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
22. See BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, THE TENTATIVE PREGNANCY 178 (1986) (discussing
her finding that the choice to abort was easier for women if the fetus was diagnosed
with a fatal defect).
23. Dan W. Brock, Preventing Genetically Transmitted Disabilities, in QUALITY OF
LIFE AND HUMAN DIFFERENCE 67, 70 (David Wasserman et al. eds., 2005).
24. See AM. MED. ASSOC. CODE OF ETHICS: E-10.01 FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE
PATIENT-PHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIP (2001), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/
pub/category/2498.html (follow "Current Options" hyperlink; then follow "E-10.00"
hyperlink; then follow "E-10.01" hyperlink) ("The patient has the right to receive
information from physicians and to discuss the benefits, risks, and costs of
appropriate treatment alternatives. Patients should receive guidance from their
physicians as to the optimal course of action."); see also American Medical
Association, Informed Consent, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/
4608.html (1998) ("Providing the patient relevant information has long been a
physician's ethical obligation.").
3
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pregnancy after a diagnosis.25 To address this problem, nearly all
jurisdictions allow "wrongful conception" or "wrongful pregnancy"
claims, which provide damages to parents for pre-conception negli-
gence. 26 For post-conception negligence, a majority of jurisdictions
allow parents to pursue damages in a claim for "wrongful birth. '27 At
present, four jurisdictions allow "wrongful life" suits, which provide
for damages to the child rather than to the parents.28
Part I of this Comment will provide an overview of the national
perspective on these three types of prenatal negligence claims.29 Part
II will discuss North Carolina's viewpoint and the evolution of its case
law addressing prenatal negligence.30 Part III examines fundamental
rights recognized by the United States Supreme Court and related
North Carolina laws.31 Part IV considers the policy issues dominating
the debate surrounding prenatal torts.32 Part V suggests North Caro-
lina should protect the rights of expectant parents through legislation
allowing medical malpractice claims for post-conception prenatal
negligence.33
25. It should be noted that abortion is only one option. With some diagnoses,
such as spina bifida, parents could choose to pursue prenatal surgery to try to correct
the physical defect.
26. David Kerrane, Damages for Wrongful Pregnancy, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
467, 476 n.3 (1997) (noting that of all the jurisdictions that have addressed the
question, only Nevada has denied a medical malpractice action).
27. See infra note 44; see also Deana A. Pollard, Wrongful Analysis in Wrongful Life
Jurisprudence, 55 ALA. L. REV. 327, 328 n.8 (2004) ("[Mlost jurisdictions have allowed
the parents' wrongful birth claim, which is generally based on essentially the same
argument, i.e., that but for the doctor's medical malpractice, the parents would have
been informed about genetic defects and would have avoided conception or aborted
the child.").
28. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (2006) (allowing the action for children
born unhealthy); Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982); Procanik v. Cillo, 478
A.2d 755 (NJ. 1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
29. See infra notes 34-80 and accompanying text (discussing the various
perspectives in a national overview of wrongful birth, wrongful life, and wrongful
conception claims).
30. See infra notes 81-184 and accompanying text (discussing North Carolina's
case law concerning prenatal negligence claims).
31. See infra notes 185-229 and accompanying text (discussing legal rulings
affecting the debate over post-conception prenatal negligence claims).
32. See infra notes 230-50 and accompanying text (discussing public policy
considerations).
33. See infra notes 251-72 and accompanying text (discussing North Carolina's
duty to ensure equitable compensation for victims of post-conception prenatal
negligence).
[Vol. 29:761
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NATIONAL OVERVIEW OF PRENATAL NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS
I. WRONGFUL BIRTH
The first post-conception prenatal negligence claims began to be
recognized by state courts in the 1970s. One of the first successful
wrongful birth suits, Becker v. Schwartz, was a consolidated appeal 34 in
which one of the plaintiffs asserted that her doctors negligently failed
to inform her that her child was more likely to have Down syndrome
due to her advanced maternal age of thirty-seven. 35 This plaintiff also
asserted that her physician failed to inform her that amniocentesis
could detect Down syndrome and provide her with the information
she needed to decide whether to continue the pregnancy. 36 The child
was born with Down syndrome, 37 and the plaintiff claimed that had
the physician properly informed her of the presence of the defect, she
would have aborted the fetus. 38 The Becker court permitted the wrong-
ful birth claim, 39 noting the right to abortion established in Roe v.
Wade4 ° and the capacity to ascertain damages for wrongful birth.41
The court determined the Beckers' claim was based on negligence
or medical malpractice and that they had alleged damages that were
readily ascertainable, including the financial burden caused by the
child's birth and continuing treatment and care. 42 The court held that
"it can be said in traditional tort language that but for the defendants'
breach of their duty to advise plaintiffs, the latter would not have been
required to assume these obligations. Calculation of damages neces-
sary to make plaintiffs whole in relation to these expenditures requires
nothing extraordinary."43
Since Becker, a majority of jurisdictions that have considered the
issue have recognized claims for wrongful birth, either as an indepen-
dent tort or as part of medical malpractice.44 The basis of the claim is
34. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978) (denying the companion
case's claim for wrongful life and allowing its claim for wrongful conception).
35. Id. at 808-09.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 808.
38. Id. at 810.
39. Id.
40. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
41. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 813.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (2006) (allowing action if child
born unhealthy); Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022 (Ala. 1993) (recognizing cause of
action for negligent failure to detect defect multiple, severe congenital abnormalities);
M.A. v. United States, 951 P.2d 851 (Alaska 1998) (allowing claim for negligent failure
5
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commonly recognized as: (1) a child is born with a defect or genetic
illness,4" and (2) either the physician negligently performed a prenatal
to detect pregnancy); Walker ex rel. Pizano v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735 (Ariz. 1990)
(commenting that court would allow action for wrongful birth); Simmons v. W.
Covina Med. Clinic, 260 Cal. Rptr. 772 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (allowing action if
causation found to a medical certainty, but holding the child may not recover the same
damages in separate claim for wrongful life); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202
(Colo. 1988) (allowing action for child born blind); Chamberland v. Physicians for
Women's Health, L.L.C., 40 Conn. L. Rptr. 731 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) (allowing
action for child with spina bifida); Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Del., 581 A.2d 288 (Del.
1989) (allowing as common law negligence claim); Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d
880 (D.C. 1987) (allowing for child with Down syndrome); Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d
415 (Fla. 1992) (allowing action for chromosomal abnormality); Siemieniec v.
Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987) (allowing action for child with
hemophilia); Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. 2000) (refusing to title the
medical malpractice action "wrongful birth"); Arche v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 798
P.2d 477 (Kan. 1990) (holding child must be severely and permanently handicapped
for parents to bring action); Reed v. Campagnolo, 630 A.2d 1145 (Md. 1993) (allowing
action using traditional medical malpractice negligence principles); Viccaro v.
Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8 (Mass. 1990) (recognizing that the jurisdiction allows claims
for wrongful birth, but claim at bar was labeled negligent genetic counseling); Shelton
v. St. Anthony's Med. Ctr., 781 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1989) (allowing action for child with
no arms and other congenital anomalies); Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345 (Nev.
1995) (allowing action under medical malpractice but refusing to complicate law with
new name of wrongful birth); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986) (allowing
action for child with congenital rubella syndrome); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (NJ.
1979) (allowing action for wrongful birth, but overruled on other grounds); Flanagan
v. Williams, 623 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (allowing action, but overruled on
other grounds); Schloss v. Miriam Hosp., No. C.A. 98-2076, 1999 WL 41875 (R.I.
Super. Jan. 11, 1999) (allowing the action, predicting the state supreme court would
hold accordingly); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (holding action not
barred by public policy); Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982) (allowing
action for child with Tay-Sachs disease); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483
(Wash. 1983) (en banc) (allowing actions for fetal hydantoin syndrome after mother
was prescribed Dilantin); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985) (allowing
parents to recover extraordinary costs); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372
(Wis. 1975) (allowing parents' recovery for child with rubella syndrome).
45. See, e.g., Smith v. Saraf, 148 F. Supp. 2d 504, 512 (D.N.J. 2001) (reiterating a
potential cause of action arises only if the child is born with defects); Viccaro, 551
N.E.2d 8 (holding that Massachusetts recognizes wrongful birth if the child is born
with a defect). This limitation is still contested, as by a Massachusetts woman who
gave birth to a healthy child after physicians performed an abortion procedure that
failed; she seeks the costs of child rearing. Jonathan Saltzman, Suit Seeks
Compensation for Botched Abortion, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 7, 2007, available at http://
www.boston.com/yourlife/health/women/articles/2007/03/07/suit-seeks-
compensation for botchedabortion/.
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diagnostic test which would have revealed the defect,4 6 or the physi-
cian failed to report the findings of the test to the parents.47 The negli-
gence of the physician proximately causes injury to the plaintiff-
parents by depriving them of the right to choose whether to terminate
the pregnancy.48
The jurisdictions allowing wrongful birth actions have not devel-
oped a standard method for calculating damages. 49 The majority view
allows only medical expenses and costs associated with the care of the
disabled child.50 Courts are divided on whether damages may be
awarded for "intangible losses;"''s only a minority of states allow for
recovery of the mother's emotional distress.5 2 Only a few jurisdictions
allow for all damages resulting from the negligence, treating it as any
46. See, e.g., Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Del., 581 A.2d 288, 292 (Del. 1989) (joining
"a majority of jurisdictions who have addressed the subject, recognizing a cause of
action for negligent performance or delay in diagnostic testing for birth defects").
47. See, e.g., Munro v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 215 Cal. App. 3d 977, 982 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (alleging "defendants intentionally and maliciously either omitted said
tests or if said tests were performed, recklessly disregarded their results and failed to
inform plaintiffs . . .that [the fetus] was afflicted with Tay-Sachs disease"). Paula
Bernstein, Fitting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: Why Traditional Tort Principles Do Not
Apply to Wrongful Birth Actions, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 297, 299 (2001).
48. See, e.g., Garrison, 581 A.2d at 290 (holding the claim actionable as medical
malpractice negligence, the injury arising from physician's depriving parents "of the
opportunity to make an informed decision to terminate the pregnancy, requiring them
to incur extraordinary expenses in the care and education of their child afflicted with a
genetic abnormality").
49. See Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1029 (Ala. 1993) ("Among the
jurisdictions that recognize the cause of action for wrongful birth, there is little
agreement on the issue of damages, and a majority does not allow recovery for
emotional distress."); see also Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985)
(prohibiting claim after discussing disagreement among jurisdictions).
50. See, e.g., Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 824 (Fla. 1984) ("There is no
valid policy argument against parents being recompensed for these costs of
extraordinary care in raising a deformed child to majority. We hold these special
upbringing costs associated with a deformed child to be recoverable."); Smith v. Cote,
513 A.2d 341, 350 ("[Pllaintiff in a wrongful birth case may recover the extraordinary
medical and educational costs attributable to the child's deformities, but may not
recover ordinary child-raising costs.").
51. See generally, JACOB A. STEIN, 2 STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 12:7 (3d.
ed. 1997).
52. Compare Keel, 624 So. 2d 1022 (holding the mental distress suffered by both
parents is compensable), with Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 351 (N.H. 1986) (holding
"damages for emotional distress are not recoverable in wrongful birth actions").
7
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other tort.53 There is also disagreement among the states about offset-
ting the resulting costs of child rearing with the benefits the parents
receive from the child's existence.5 4
II. WRONGFUL LIFE
The California Supreme Court first affirmed a wrongful life cause
of action in Turpin v. Sortini in 1982. 55 Turpin was conceived and sub-
sequently born deaf after an older sibling was incorrectly diagnosed as
having normal hearing.5 6 The correct diagnosis would have revealed
hereditary deafness.5 7
The court acknowledged the sanctity of life, but it held that this
did not prevent the claim, reasoning that it was difficult to believe that
"an award of damages to a severely handicapped or suffering child
would 'disavow' the value of life or in any way suggest that the child is
not entitled to the full measure of legal and nonlegal rights and privi-
leges accorded to all members of society. 585 The court further
explained, "while our society and our legal system unquestionably
place the highest value on all human life, we do not think that it is
accurate to suggest that this state's public policy establishes-as a mat-
ter of law-that under all circumstances 'impaired life' is 'preferable' to
53. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying
Alabama law, holding a negligent tortfeasor in medical malpractice is held liable for all
damages proximately caused by his negligence).
54. Compare Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (offsetting
costs with benefits received is appropriate) and Bader v. Johnson, 675 N.E.2d 1119
(Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (holding jury's application of benefits rule appropriate) with
Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 842 (NJ. 1981) (criticizing practice of offsetting
costs with benefits to parents).
55. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982). California's appellate court had
previously allowed a wrongful life suit by a child with Tay-Sachs disease in Curlender v.
Bioscience Lab., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). The appellate court found the
claim distinguishable from previous attempts by healthy children to bring wrongful
life suits based on illegitimacy. Id. at 488. The Supreme Court's decision in Turpin
affirmed Curlender but overruled a portion that held the child could bring an action
against anyone, including parents, as a statute prohibiting such damages had been
enacted in Curlender's wake. Turpin, 643 P.2d at 959.
56. Id. at 956.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 961-62.
8
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'nonlife."'59 However, the court conceded that Turpin's deafness was
unlikely to be found "worse than not being born at all" by a jury.6 °
Only two other courts have adopted the tort since Turpin,61 even
though it has been addressed elsewhere.62 Maine's statutes allow a
claim for wrongful life, provided the child is not born healthy.63 Other
jurisdictions have stated various reasons for rejecting the cause of
action, usually finding that it is impossible to measure an impaired life
against non-existence, and thus, there must be no injury cognizable at
law.64 One court that allowed the action noted, "One reason for the
59. Id. at 962. As evidence of this policy, the court pointed to statutes in the
Health and Safety Code section 7186, recognizing patient autonomy in deciding
whether to accept life-prolonging treatment. Id.
60. Id.
61. Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (NJ. 1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, 656 P.2d
483 (Wash. 1983).
62. See, e.g., Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Del., 581 A.2d 288 (Del. 1989) (holding
child's claim for wrongful life was not actionable); Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla.
1992) (holding tort of wrongful life not cognizable under state law); Atlanta Obstetrics
& Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557 (Ga. 1990) (implying wrongful life
claims would not be cognizable); Goldberg v. Ruskin, 499 N.E.2d 406 (Il1. 1986)
(holding child may not recover general damages for pain and suffering); Cowe v.
Forum Group, 575 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. 1991) (holding damages for wrongful life not
cognizable under state law); Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 635 (Kan. 1986)
(holding there was no recognized cause of action for wrongful life); Kassama v. Magat,
792 A.2d 1102 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (holding life cannot be an injury for tort
law); Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (holding wrongful life
not recognized in Michigan); Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345 (Nev. 1995)
(holding no action for wrongful life exists); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986)
(holding child could not maintain action); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933
(N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (holding child could not recover for wrongful life); Azzolino v.
Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985) (holding life cannot be an injury); Hester v.
Dwivedi 733 N.E.2d 1161 (Ohio 2000) (holding judges and juries are incapable of
weighing a life with defects against nonbeing); Ellis v. Sherman, 515 A.2d 1327 (Pa.
1986) (holding child suffered no legal injury and thus could not recover); Willis v.
Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63 (S.C. 2004) (holding the tort was not cognizable); Nelson v.
Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984) (holding there was no cause of action in Texas);
James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985) (holding that absent a statute
allowing it, there was no cause of action); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d
372 (Wis. 1975) (holding child had no cause of action since damages could not be
measured).
63. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (2006).
64. See, e.g., Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988) (agreeing with
"overwhelming majority" of courts that existence, however impaired, cannot be "a
legally cognizable injury relative to nonexistence"); Garrison, 581 A.2d 288 (holding
the child's life is not a legally cognizable injury, even if impaired); Blake v. Cruz, 698
P.2d 315 (Idaho 1984) ("Basic to our culture is the precept that life is precious. As a
society, therefore, our laws have as their driving force the purpose of protecting,
9
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reluctance of other jurisdictions to recognize a duty to the child
appears to be the attitude that to do so would represent a disavowal of
the sanctity of a less-than-perfect human life."'65 Nine states have gone
a step further and prohibited wrongful life torts by statute.66 Even in
the jurisdictions recognizing the action, only special damages may be
awarded.67
III. WRONGFUL CONCEPTION
Wilbur v. Kerr68 represents the majority view of wrongful concep-
tion claims. The plaintiffs brought a claim against a physician who
negligently performed two unsuccessful vasectomies on the plaintiff-
father, who was not informed that the procedures had failed. 69 The
plaintiff-wife then became pregnant and delivered a healthy baby.7 °
The court examined other jurisdictions' reasoning and found two
major lines of cases: those allowing all foreseeable damages resulting
from a negligent sterilization, including child-rearing expenses, and
preserving and improving the quality of human existence. To recognize wrongful life
as a tort would do violence to that purpose and is completely contradictory to the
belief that life is precious."), superseded by statute, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-334 (2006);
Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Il1. 1987) (discussing the view
that an impaired life cannot constitute an injury at law as a primary reason to prohibit
the action); Bruggeman, 718 P.2d 635 (following reasoning of other jurisdictions
finding life is precious); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983) ("[Rlecovery for
such damages is contrary to public policy .... That a child can be considered as an
injury offends fundamental concepts attached to human life."); Proffitt v. Bartolo, 412
N.W.2d 232 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (holding it "logically impossible" to weigh an
impaired life against nonexistence); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978)
(holding the child did not have a fundamental right to be born "a whole, functional
human being").
65. Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 496.
66. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-334 (2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-12-1-1 (West 2006);
MICH. CoMP. LAwS ANN. § 600.2971 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424 (West
2006); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.130 (West 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-43 (2006); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(B) (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-1 (2006);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (2006).
67. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (limiting damages to that which is
"associated with the disease, defect or handicap suffered by the child"); Turpin, 643
P.2d at 963-64 (holding jury could calculate special damages but not general
damages); Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 496 (allowing damages in wrongful life claim for
extraordinary out-of-pocket expenses past child's majority to deter negligent conduct);
Procanik, 478 A.2d at 763-64 (holding it too speculative to allow anything but special
damages).
68. Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982) (allowing the claim for damages
associated with pregnancy).
69. Id. at 569.
70. Id.
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those prohibiting damages for child-rearing, as it would be against
public policy. 71 Ultimately agreeing that it was better public policy to
allow damages only for expenses related to pregnancy and childbirth,
the court denied the plaintiffs' claim for child-rearing expenses. 72 The
court was concerned about emotionally damaging a child who learns
that he was an "unwanted or 'emotional bastard,"' whose parents did
not want him and "went to court to force someone else to pay for [his]
raising[.]" 73 Damages for the costs related to the operation and the
pregnancy would have been allowed had the plaintiffs made this
claim.74
Wrongful conception actions may be brought after the negligence
of a health care provider causes a woman to become pregnant, either
by performing a faulty sterilization procedure75 or by incorrectly dis-
pensing oral contraceptives.76 Wrongful conception has been recog-
nized as a tort action in every jurisdiction that has considered the
claim, except for Nevada, which recognized only a potential action for
breach of contract.7 7 A child in these actions is typically born healthy,
71. Id. at 569-70. The court also noted that some jurisdictions tried to find a
middle ground by allowing child-rearing expenses but offsetting them by the benefits
received as parents. Id at 571. Still other courts pondered the parents' responsibility
to mitigate damages by placing the child for adoption or aborting it, but this had never
been made the rule. Id. at 570.
72. Id. at 571.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bumgardner, 347 S.E.2d 743 (N.C. 1986) (allowing action
for physician's failure to replace birth control device resulting pregnancy); Taylor v.
Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing the multiple forms of
wrongful conception cases).
76. Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (allowing action after
pharmacist negligently dispensed tranquilizers rather than oral contraceptives).
77. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2971 (West 2006) (allowing action
only if acts were intentional or grossly negligent); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718
(Ala. 1982) (treating claim as medical malpractice action); Univ. Ariz. Health Sciences
Ctr. v. Super. Ct. of Maricopa County, 667 P.2d 1294 (Ariz. 1983) (determining
appropriate damages for negligence); Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1967) (allowing for both tort and breach of contract); Camacho v. Mennonite Bd.
of Missions, 703 P.2d 598 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (recognizing cause of action for
negligence); Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 327
A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); Flowers v. Dist. of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C.
1984) (describing action for negligent sterilization as "wrongful birth," but refusing to
include the "negligence action" as a type of medical malpractice so as not to apply the
avoidable consequences doctrine); Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1970) (allowing breach of contract); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d
1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (describing action for negligent sterilization as
"wrongful birth"); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653 (Ga. 1984)
11
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leading most courts, as in Wilbur, to deny recovery for the normal
expenses of child-rearing. 78 Damages are generally limited to the med-
(stating the action is "no more than a species of malpractice and should be
recognized"); Doerr v. Villate, 220 N.E.2d 767 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966) (allowing action as
either tort or breach of contract); Garrison v. Foy, 486 N.E.2d 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)
(noting the action requires only the application of medical negligence laws); Nanke v.
Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1984) (allowing action following negligently
performed therapeutic abortion); Byrd v. Wesley Med. Ctr., 699 P.2d 459 (Kan. 1985)
(treating as a medical malpractice action); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky.
1983) (allowing as medical malpractice claim); Conner v. Stelly, 02-549 (La. App. 3
Cir. Oct. 30, 2002), 830 So. 2d 1102 (treating the tort as medical malpractice action);
Musk v. Nelson, 647 A.2d 1198 (Me. 1994) (holding Maine's wrongful birth/wrongful
life statute did not create separate cause of action for wrongful conception, as it was a
type of professional negligence action); Dehn v. Edgecomb, 865 A.2d 603, 610 (Md.
2005) (stating the action is "to be treated like any other medical malpractice tort, that
is, as a traditional negligence claim"); Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990)
(holding physician may be held liable for medical malpractice or breach of warranty);
Christensen v. Thornby, 255 N.W. 620 (Minn. 1934) (earliest case standing for
proposition that cause of action exists for improperly performed sterilization);
Hudson v. Parvin, 582 So. 2d 403 (Miss. 1991) (allowing actions for medical
malpractice and breach of guarantee) (overruled on other grounds); Miller v. Duhart,
637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (holding the action is a form of malpractice);
Hitzemann v. Adam, 518 N.W.2d 102 (Neb. 1994) (recognizing as a medical
malpractice claim); Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076 (Nev. 1986) (allowing action
for breach of contract but not tort); P. v. Portadin, 432 A.2d 556 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1981) (allowing action under tort law); Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d
603 (N.M. 1991) (applying tort principles); Weintraub v. Brown, 98 A.D.2d 339 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1983) (allowing as a medical malpractice claim); Jackson v. Bumgardner,
347 S.E.2d 743 (N.C. 1986) (holding a wrongful conception claim is
"indistinguishable from an ordinary medical malpractice action"); Bowman v. Davis,
356 N.E.2d 496 (Ohio 1976) (holding the claim was "a traditional negligence action");
Morris v. Sanchez, 746 P.2d 184 (Okla. 1987) (recognizing action as a medical
malpractice claim); Zehr v. Haugen, 871 P.2d 1006 (Or. 1994) (allowing claims for
breach of contract and negligence); Hatter v. Landsberg, 563 A.2d 146 (Penn. Super.
Ct. 1989) (holding statute barring wrongful birth and wrongful life did not bar
wrongful conception); Emerson v. Magendantz, 689 A.2d 409 (R.I. 1997) (holding the
action is a tort); Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1987) (recognizing claim as a
tort); Crawford v. Kirk, 929 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1996) (holding wrongful pregnancy is a
valid medical malpractice claim); Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E.2d 301 (Va. 1986)
(holding traditional tort principles should be applied); McKernan v. Aasheim, 687
P.2d 850 (Wash. 1984) (allowing as tort action); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872
(W. Va. 1985) (recognizing the cause of action as a tort); Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450
N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1990) (recognizing the action as the tort of negligent sterilization);
Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982) (noting the action is necessary
component of medical malpractice law).
78. See, e.g., Flowers, 478 A.2d 1073 (denying child-rearing expenses according to
public policy); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984) (denying ordinary
child-rearing costs for all children, but allowing extraordinary child-rearing costs for
12
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ical expenses associated with the pregnancy and delivery, the associ-
ated pain and suffering of the mother, and sometimes loss of
consortium for the father. 79 Only a few jurisdictions have allowed par-
ents to recover the costs of rearing a healthy child.80
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
I. WRONGFUL BIRTH AND WRONGFUL LIFE
A. North Carolina Court of Appeals Allows Claims
North Carolina's legal positions on wrongful birth and wrongful
life were decided in Azzolino v. Dingfelder more than twenty years
ago.81 The Azzolino family complained of negligence after a nurse
practitioner and a physician failed to inform Mrs. Azzolino about the
utility of amniocentesis."2 The test would have revealed the thirty-six-
year-old woman's fetus had birth defects.8 3 The Azzolinos argued they
were deprived of the choice of terminating the pregnancy, and as a
result, the child was born with Down syndrome. 84
child born with defects); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653 (Ga.
1984) (holding costs of raising a child cannot be recovered); Nanke v. Napier, 346
N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1984) (holding parents of healthy child could not recover child-
rearing expenses); Byrd, 699 P.2d 459 (holding mother could not recover expected
child-rearing costs for healthy child).
79. See, e.g., Boone, 416 So.2d 718; Coleman, 327 A.2d 757; Macomber v. Dillman,
505 A.2d 810 (Me. 1986); Weintraub, 98 A.D.2d 339 (allowing for loss of consortium
for husband but not for wife).
80. See, e.g., Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429 (Md. 1984) (allowing claim but
offsetting benefits to parents); Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990) (allowing
damages for costs of rearing healthy child to majority if sterilization was sought for
economic reasons); Marciniak, 450 N.W.2d 243 (holding it would not be equitable to
offset benefits).
81. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985).
82. See Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 322 S.E.2d 567, 573-74 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984),
decision affd in part, rev'd in part, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985) ("In response to a direct
question from Mrs. Azzolino regarding the advisability of this procedure, defendant...
spoke of her own personal and religious prejudices, and those of her husband, against
the use of amniocentesis. She advised Mrs. Azzolino of the medical risks associated
with amniocentesis, without setting those risks in the context of a complete risk-
benefit analysis and thus unduly emphasized those risks. In response to a similar
question addressed to him, Dr. Dingfelder advised Mrs. Azzolino that she need not
worry about amniocentesis because it was not necessary or advisable for her as the
upswing was for women [thirty-seven] years of age or older.").
83. Id.
84. Id. at 574. The complaint alleged that had they known the child would have
Down syndrome, they would have terminated the pregnancy by abortion. Id.
13
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After the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, 5 the court of
appeals unanimously recognized actions for wrongful birth and wrong-
ful life.86 The court of appeals first defined wrongful life as an action
"brought by or on behalf of an impaired child who alleges that but for
the defendant doctor or health care provider's negligent advice to or
treatment of his parents, the child would not have been born."87
The court of appeals determined that in order to successfully pur-
sue the claim for wrongful life, the Azzolino child "must demonstrate
the existence of a duty, the breach of which may be considered the
proximate cause of the damages suffered by the injured party," which
are the same elements required of any negligence action.88 The court
of appeals held the defendants had a duty to inform the plaintiffs of
the genetic risk to "make them aware of the possibility or probability
that their future children will be genetically impaired and give[ ] them
an opportunity to decide whether life is best for the child."89 This
duty had been extended to the child in Stetson v. Easterling,90 a deci-
sion allowing infants to recover for a physician's prenatal negligence. 9'
Thus, the defendants had the responsibility to provide the infant with
"an opportunity to be relieved of a life with impairments."92
Finally, the court of appeals held "the complaint state[d] a suffi-
cient causal relationship between the defendants' alleged negligence in
advising Mrs. Azzolino about amniocentesis and the subsequent birth
of [the child]."93 After examining the modern trend among other juris-
dictions,94 the court of appeals held the child could "recover as special
damages the extraordinary expenses to be incurred during his lifetime
as a result of his impairment."95 The court added, "We are unwilling,
and indeed, unable to say as a matter of law that life even with the
85. Id. at 572. The trial court dismissed the child's claim for wrongful life and the
siblings' claim for damages, allowed defendants' summary judgment motion on
punitive damages, and allowed defendants' motion for directed verdict thereby
dismissing parents' wrongful birth claim. Id.
86. Id. at 588.
87. Id. at 573.
88. Id. at 574.
89. Id.
90. Stetson v. Easterling, 161 S.E.2d 531 (N.C. 1968).
.91. Azzolino, 322 S.E.2d at 574.
92. Id. at 574-75.
93. Id. at 575.
94. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755
(NJ. 1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
95. Azzolino, 322 S.E.2d at 575-76.
774 [Vol. 29:761
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most severe and debilitating of impairments is always preferable to
nonexistence. '"96
The court of appeals then examined the parents' claim for wrong-
ful birth, defining it as "an action brought by parents against a physi-
cian or other health care provider who allegedly failed to inform them
of the increased possibility that the mother would give birth to a child
suffering from birth defects thereby precluding an informed decision
about whether to have the child."9 7 This claim also had the required
elements for a tort-duty, breach, proximate cause, and damages-and
was recognized as a viable action.98 The final element, however, was
again the most troublesome due to the wide variance among jurisdic-
tions as to the appropriate measure of recovery.99 The parents sought
to recover:
* . . damages for the medical and hospital expenses of the pregnancy
and childbirth; damages for the nervousness, inconvenience, physical
restrictions, loss of consortium, and anxiety suffered by them because
of the pregnancy and childbirth; damages for the mental anguish
which they have endured and will continue to endure because they
have brought into the world a child afflicted with Down's Syndrome;
the ordinary and extraordinary cost of supporting, educating, and pro-
viding the attention for [their child] which he requires; damages for
past and future loss or diminution of the consortium of each other
because of the extraordinary demands placed on them by [their child];
damages for Mrs. Azzolino's lost earnings occasioned by her preg-
nancy and by the need for her to care for [their child] on a daily basis;
and other miscellaneous damages.100
The court of appeals held that to allow the parents to recover all they
were seeking would be "wholly disproportionate to the culpability" of
the defendants,' 1 and allowed recovery only for mental anguish, as
the child could recover for his extraordinary expenses in his own
claim. 10 2 Punitive damages were not allowed under the facts of the
case. 103
96. Id. at 576.
97. Id. at 580.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 581.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 587-88 (stating aggravating behavior did not occur at the time of the
tortious conduct).
775
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B. North Carolina Supreme Court Reverses and Prohibits Claims
The North Carolina Supreme Court accepted Azzolino for discre-
tionary review and reversed the North Carolina Court of Appeals in a
4-3 decision, finding neither the parents nor the child stated a claim
upon which relief could be granted.' °4
The supreme court defined wrongful life as "a claim for relief by
or on behalf of a defective child who alleges that but for the defen-
dant's negligent treatment or advice to its parents, the child would not
have been born."'0 5 Such a claim would necessarily be intertwined
with a claim for wrongful birth, as the "filaments of family life,
although individually spun, create a web of interconnected legal inter-
ests.'1 0 6 The supreme court also noted that the jurisdictions allowing
claims for wrongful life had recognized it would be "anomalous to per-
mit only parents, and not the child, to recover for the cost of the child's
own medical care.'
0 7
The supreme court attempted to analyze the claim for wrongful
life as if it were a traditional tort, assuming the physician owed a duty
to the fetus, 108 and had the Azzolinos been properly informed of the
birth defect, they would have had an abortion.' 0 9 The traditional anal-
ysis stopped there, however, as the injury at issue was the child's
life." ° The supreme court noted the lower court's attempt to make an
equitable decision: "We are aware that the decision of the Court of
Appeals recognizing [the child's] claim for relief for wrongful life repre-
sents an honest and principled effort by that court to address and
resolve genuine social problems thrust upon the courts by recent devel-
opments in science and medicine.""'
104. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 530 (N.C. 1985) (denying siblings'
claim in addition to parents' and child's claims).
105. Id. at 531.
106. Id. at 532 (citing Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A. 2d 755, 762 (NJ. 1984)).
107. Id. (citing Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P. 2d 954, 965 (Cal. 1982)).
108. North Carolina first established a physician's duty to a fetus at the point of
viability, allowing a wrongful death suit in DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489, 491-
92 (N.C. 1987) (construing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984)). However, the state
refused to extend this recognition to allow a homicide prosecution for causing the
death of a viable fetus in State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1989). North Carolina may,
however, prosecute for willfully causing the death of a fetus with drugs or instruments
under N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-44, 14-45 (2006), notwithstanding the provisions of N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1.
109. Azzolino, 337 S.E.2d at 532.
110. Id.
111. Id.
[Vol. 29:761
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For the supreme court, the need to address new problems where
law and medicine converge was outweighed by the dilemma juries
would face in trying to decide whether non-existence would be better
than an impaired life and what the corresponding economic damages
would be." 2 The supreme court found the reasoning of the New York
Court of Appeals113 compelling, as it also focused on the comparison
between life and non-existence, and the staggering implications of try-
ing to determine which would be better. 1 4 Concluding that "life, even
life with severe defects, may not be an injury in the legal sense," the
supreme court closed the door on wrongful life claims.115
Turning to the claim for wrongful birth, the Supreme Court
defined it as a claim made by parents "who allege that the negligent
treatment or advice deprived them of the choice of terminating preg-
nancy by abortion and preventing the birth of the defective child.""' 6
The supreme court began its analysis by assuming arguendo that duty
and breach of duty existed and further assumed that the defendants'
negligence was the proximate cause of the child's birth." 7 But at this
point in its evaluation, the court determined that in recognizing
wrongful birth as a tort, other jurisdictions had to find that life itself
could constitute an injury at law." 8 The supreme court observed,
"Far from being 'traditional' tort analysis, such a step requires a view of
human life previously unknown to the law of this jurisdiction.""' 9 The
supreme court again held that "life, even life with severe defects" could
not be a legally cognizable injury. 2 °
The supreme court viewed the disagreement among other jurisdic-
tions regarding the methods used to calculate damages as further proof
of the claim's poor fit for traditional tort analysis, noting that the
injury for which courts are trying to compensate is "the existence of a
human life."' 2 1 In a traditional tort action, "defendants are liable for
all of the reasonably foreseeable results of their negligent acts or omis-
sions," but few jurisdictions recognized this as an appropriate measure
for wrongful birth.122 Related problems with calculating damages
112. Id. at 533.
113. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978).
114. Azzolino, 337 S.E.2d at 533.
115. Id. at 532.
116. Id. at 531.
117. Id. at 533.
118. Id. at 533-34.
119. Id. at 534.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
777
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would include the questions of whether the parents had a duty to place
the child up for adoption, or whether the damages should be offset by
the intangible benefits they would receive from their child. 123 Further,
the supreme court stated that wrongful birth would be "peculiarly sub-
ject to fraudulent claims," as parents could easily invent a prenatal
desire to abort the fetus or deny the possibility they would have con-
sidered bearing the child knowing of the defect. 124
Public policy concerns were central to the supreme court's refusal
to recognize wrongful birth as a tort. The court expressed its fear of
the slippery slope in allowing wrongful birth actions, foretelling claims
for infants born "of one sex rather than the other" or for infants born
with carrier genes. 125 The court was also concerned that physicians,
uncertain of the distress parents might feel about bearing a child with
genetic abnormalities, would resort to recommending abortion, fearing
a wrongful birth lawsuit.
126
Thus, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that claims for
wrongful birth would not be recognized "absent a clear mandate by the
legislature.' 27 Unlike the courts, the General Assembly could "pro-
vide an appropriate forum for a full and open debate of all of the issues
.. at one time and do so without being required to attempt to squeeze
its results into the mold of conventional tort concepts which clearly do
not fit."'1
28
The three dissenting justices each wrote separately in support of
recognizing wrongful birth actions in North Carolina. 129 Justice Exum
first expressed that this case, and others like it, should be viewed in its
simplest and most basic terms, eliminating the "thorny moral, philo-
sophical, and theological questions." 3 ° The injury was the woman's
deprivation of the choice to terminate her pregnancy, as North Caro-
lina's abortion statute placed the right to choose in the hands of the
123. Id.
124. Id. at 535.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 533.
128. Id. at 537 (sharing the view of dissenting Justice Wachtler in Becker v.
Schwartz, 386 N.E. 2d 807, 816-19 (1978) that "[t]he heart of the problem in these
cases is that the physician cannot be said to have caused the defect. The disorder is
genetic and not the result of any injury negligently inflicted by the doctor .... The
child's handicap is an inexorable result of conception and birth.").
129. Id. at 537-42 (Exum, J., dissenting; Frye, J., dissenting; and Martin, J.,
dissenting, but concurring with the majority opinion prohibiting wrongful life claims
and siblings' claims for damages).
130. Id. at 537 (Exum, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 29:761778
18
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 8
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol29/iss3/8
2007] POST-CONCEPTION PRENATAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 779
parents. 131 Damages could be properly measured by comparing the
parent's unexpected reality to their former expectations. 1 32 This
would entitle the parents to extraordinary damages and the pain, suf-
fering, and mental anguish caused by the birth defect but not the ordi-
nary costs of child-rearing. 133 Justice Exum specifically did not
support offsetting damages by intangible benefits, reasoning that if
parents bear the financial costs for a healthy child, they would be enti-
tled to the benefits. 134
Justice Frye noted that the majority of jurisdictions allow claims
for wrongful birth, and the court should have adopted the claim and
allowed the "appropriate measure of damages.' 3 5 Unlike the majority
opinion, Justice Frye recommended allowing the claim through the
courts unless the legislature passed a statute barring it. 1 36
Justice Martin wrote the strongest dissent, stating that wrongful
birth should be a malpractice action based upon the physician's negli-
gent genetic counseling and treatment of the pregnant woman, depriv-
ing her of the opportunity to make an informed decision on whether to
abort the fetus. 137 He also disagreed as to the injury at issue: sug-
gesting that the birth of the child was the injury, not the existence of
life.' 38
Justice Martin also pointed out that North Carolina's statute gov-
erning informed consent 139 should be applied to these situations.140
As with traditional torts, the parents would be entitled to all damages
proximately resulting from the injury, which would consist of the costs
of childbirth, physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, and the
extraordinary expenses of rearing a child with a birth defect.14 '
Unlike Justice Exum, Justice Martin recommended offsetting damages
with the benefits the parents would receive.' 4 2 Finally, Justice Martin
stated the denial of this claim was a violation of the parents' constitu-
131. Id. at 538.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 539.
134. Id.
135. Id. (Frye, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 540 (Martin, J., dissenting, but concurring with the majority opinion
prohibiting wrongful life claims and siblings' claims for damages).
138. Id.
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13 (2006).
140. Azzolino, 337 S.E.2d at 540.
141. Id. at 541.
142. Id.
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tional rights, as a valid cause of action is protected by the open courts
clause of the state constitution. 143
II. WRONGFUL CONCEPTION
A. New Claim for Medical Malpractice - 1986
North Carolina recognizes a wrongful conception claim, an action
typically brought after a physician negligently performs a sterilization
procedure that results in pregnancy. 144 The first case establishing the
claim was Jackson v. Bumgardner,145 in which a physician twice per-
formed surgery on a woman who asked that her intrauterine device
("IUD") be replaced if it were removed during the surgeries. 146 The
couple told the doctor that they could not afford another child. 147 In
the second surgery, the doctor failed to replace the IUD but informed
the couple that it was in place.'14  The woman then became pregnant
and delivered a healthy child. 149 After the trial court dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals reversed.15 0
Upon discretionary review, the North Carolina Supreme Court
determined that "the vast majority of courts which have considered
wrongful conception cases have viewed the case as being indistinguish-
able from an ordinary medical malpractice action where the plaintiff
alleges a breach of duty on the part of a physician and resulting injury
for failure to perform that duty."' 5 ' The defendant had a duty to treat
the plaintiff with the necessary standard of care for her medical condi-
tion and breached that duty by failing to replace the IUD.'1 2 He with-
held this information from her, knowing she was relying on the
procedure and this information to avoid pregnancy, and as a result,
she became pregnant, suffering the very injury she had sought his help
to avoid.15 3
143. Id. at 542.
144. See McAllister v. Ha, 496 S.E.2d 577 (N.C. 1998) (distinguishing wrongful
conception or wrongful pregnancy claims from wrongful birth and wrongful life
claims).
145. Jackson v. Bumgardner, 347 S.E.2d 743 (N.C. 1986).
146. Id. at 745.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Jackson v. Bumgardner, 321 S.E.2d 541 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) affd in part, rev'd
in part, 347 S.E.2d 743 (N.C. 1986).
151. Jackson, 347 S.E.2d at 747.
152. Id.
153. Id.
[Vol. 29:761
20
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 8
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol29/iss3/8
2007] POST-CONCEPTION PRENATAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 781
The fact that the plaintiff gave birth to a healthy child was not
material to the court's analysis. Specifically, "it [wa]s the fact of the
pregnancy as a medical condition that [gave] rise to compensable dam-
ages and complete[d] the elements for a claim of negligence."1 54 The
holding of Azzolino did not preclude the wrongful conception claim, as
the Jacksons sought damages for a medical condition rather than for
their child's life.15 5 The Jackson court allowed the mother to proceed
with her medical malpractice claim, but she would not be allowed to
recover the costs of rearing the child, which would be contrary to the
rationale of Azzolino. 156
B. Genetic Counseling Cases Arrive - 1988
The claim for wrongful conception has also been successful under
North Carolina law after a physician failed to provide correct genetic
screening results, resulting in the birth of a child with defects. 15 7 In
Gallagher v. Duke, the plaintiffs were parents of two girls, each born
with multiple, severe birth defects. 158 The first child died less than
three weeks after birth.'5 9 Cytogeneticists reported to the parents that
there were no genetic abnormalities found, and their chances of con-
ceiving a child without defects would be the same as the general
population. 16
0
Relying on this advice, the Gallaghers conceived a second child.
161
They were then referred to the University of North Carolina Genetic
Counseling Department, where the department used the previous test
results to counsel the Gallaghers that amniocentesis was unneces-
sary. 162 The Gallaghers' second child was subsequently born with
severe birth defects, and more genetic testing was performed. 163 This
time genetic abnormalities were found. 164 When these results were
compared to the first child's samples, they found the first child had the
same or similar genetic abnormalities, which should have been
detected when first examined.
165
154. Id. at 748 (emphasis in original).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 750, 752.
157. Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 852 F.2d 773 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
158. Id. at 774-75.
159. Id. at 775.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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The Middle District of North Carolina held that a medical mal-
practice action based on wrongful conception would be recognized in
North Carolina when a child was born with genetic defects since the
North Carolina Supreme Court had recognized an action for wrongful
conception in Jackson when a healthy child was born. 166 Thus, in
North Carolina, the health of the child born is irrelevant in a claim for
wrongful conception. 167 Ultimately, the court permitted damages for
the costs of rearing a child with medical and special care needs 168 and
claims for emotional distress.
169
C. Breaking New Ground with Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress - 1998
The state supreme court decided a similar case to Gallagher,
McAllister v. Ha,'7 ° ten years later. After having a child in May 1991,
the McAllisters received notice from the State Health Department that
they should be tested for sickle-cell disease because of possible genetic
traits which their son could have inherited. 17 ' The defendant physi-
cian took blood samples for testing and told the McAllisters he would
call them if there was a problem, and if they did not hear from him,
there was no cause for concern. 172 The physician never informed the
family of the test results that showed the father was a carrier of the
disease, even though Mrs. McAllister saw him four times before she
conceived a second child. 173 This child was born with sickle-cell dis-
ease, causing the child to need special medical care and daily medica-
tion until the age of five. 1 74
The supreme court allowed the McAllisters to proceed with their
claims against the physician for medical malpractice and negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Basing their decision partly on Jack-
son, the court first held the McAllisters' claim for medical malpractice
was more properly classified as wrongful conception than wrongful
birth, as the negligence technically occurred pre-conception.175
Negligent infliction of emotional distress was also held to be a
proper claim, as "[pilaintiffs alleged that defendant's negligence
166. Id. at 776.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 777.
169. Id. at 779.
170. McAllister v. Ha, 496 S.E.2d 577 (N.C. 1998).
171. Id. at 580.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 582.
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caused them 'extreme mental and emotional distress,' specifically
referring to plaintiff-wife's fears regarding her son's health and her
resultant sleeplessness."1 76 Because of the physician's negligence, the
McAllisters did not know of their child's disease prior to his birth and
believed that the child was healthy. Therefore, the mother's severe
emotional distress from worrying about her son's health could have
only occurred after he was born. This holding broke new ground, as it
allowed parents to pursue the claim of negligent infliction of emotional
distress resulting from the live birth of their child with birth defects for
the first time in North Carolina.
This holding was supported by Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gyn-
ecology Associates, which allowed both parents to pursue a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress after a physician's poor pre-
natal care caused the death of a fetus and its stillbirth. 177 Johnson held
that in order to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress, a plaintiff must allege: "(1) the defendant negligently engaged in
conduct, (2) it was reasonably foreseeable that such conduct would
cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress (often referred to as
'mental anguish'), and (3) the conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff
severe emotional distress."1 7 8 The McAllister court held that while the
allegations were sparse, the McAllisters sufficiently alleged the ele-
ments of the claim: "Plaintiffs here alleged that plaintiff-wife became
pregnant and gave birth to a child with sickle-cell disease as a result of
defendant's negligence[,]" causing Mrs. McAllister to suffer severe
emotional distress. 179 The court did not comment on the merits of the
claim, stating, "Whether defendant's alleged negligence in fact caused
either of the plaintiffs to suffer severe emotional distress is a question
for the trier of fact."180
To complete the claim, it must also be alleged that the defendant's
negligence was the foreseeable and proximate cause of the severe emo-
tional distress, but "neither a physical impact, a physical injury, nor a
subsequent physical manifestation of emotional distress is an element
of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress." 181 Impor-
tantly for the McAllisters' claim, the Johnson court held "a plaintiff may
recover for his or her severe emotional distress arising due to concern
for another person, if the plaintiff can prove that he or she has suffered
176. Id. at 583.
177. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 395 S.E.2d 85 (N.C. 1990).
178. Id. at 97.
179. McAllister, 496 S.E.2d at 583.
180. Id.
181. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
783.
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such severe emotional distress as a proximate and foreseeable result of
the defendant's negligence. 11
2
The McAllister court did not allow the parents to pursue damages
for child-rearing in their medical malpractice claim, citing Azzolino as
controlling the analysis. 1 3 As life could not constitute an injury at
law, the McAllisters could not seek damages for the costs of their
child's extraordinary care.1 8
4
LEGAL PRECEDENTS AND PERSPECTIVES
I. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS FURTHER DEFINED SINCE AZZOLINO
A. Planned Parenthood v. Casey
The restrictions on abortion in North Carolina and other states
are allowed despite Roe v. Wade'"" because of Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.186 While Casey reaffirmed Roe v. Wade by recognizing a
woman's right to choose an abortion prior to the fetus's viability, it
eliminated the trimester framework and created a new standard that
allowed states to restrict abortion unless it created an "undue burden"
on a woman "seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."' 8 7
North Carolina legislators have wanted to push the boundaries of
states' abilities to restrict abortion. There were multiple bills in the
2005-2006 session of the General Assembly that indicated lawmakers'
desire to further reduce the availability of abortions,' including a bill
prohibiting the State Employee Health Plan from reimbursing for any
abortion,'8 9 a bill imposing a twenty-four hour waiting period prior to
obtaining an abortion, 9 ' and a bill imposing a notarized consent
requirement for minors.' 9 '
182. Id.
183. McAllister, 496 S.E.2d at 584.
184. Id. at 583-84.
185. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing the trimester framework to
delineate when the state may or may not interfere with a woman's fundamental right to
terminate her pregnancy).
186. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
187. Id. at 877.
188. As of the close of the 2005-2006 session, none of the bills had been enacted.
189. S.B. 106, 2005-2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2006); see also H.B. 289,
2005-2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2006) (providing no coverage for abortion in
State Employee Health Plan unless mother's life is in danger or pregnancy resulted
from incest or rape).
190. H.B. 1488, 2005-2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2005); S.B. 549, 2005-
2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2005).
191. H.B. 1200, 2005-2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2005); S.B. 1135, 2005-
2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2005).
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One particular House bill proposed an amendment to the abor-
tion statute that would provide immunity for any health care provider
who, due to a moral objection to abortion, failed to participate in the
care of a woman seeking medical procedures relating to abortion. 192
This bill, if it were to become law, could result in the lack of any legal
recourse for a woman whose medical provider knowingly acted to pre-
vent the woman from exercising her right to have an abortion. For
example, a physician or other health care worker morally opposed to
abortion could knowingly withhold from a patient her genetic screen-
ing results to prevent her from aborting the fetus, and there would be
no legal recourse for the physician's failure to provide the patient with
informed care and treatment options. 193
Despite these attempts to curb access to abortion, the procedure is
still legal for any woman, for any reason, until the twentieth week of
pregnancy. 9 " After the twentieth week, a woman may obtain an abor-
tion only if continuing the pregnancy gravely impairs her health or
places her life at risk. 195 A woman may not obtain an abortion after
the twentieth week for the sole purpose of terminating a fetus with
severe birth defects.
196
B. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health
In Cruzan, the Supreme Court faced for the first time the question
of whether the Constitution provides the "right to die."1 97 In its deci-
sion, the Court recognized that "a competent person has a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment."'1 98 The right to make this "deeply personal decision"' 99 is
based in a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest rather than in the
right to privacy. 200 For an incompetent person such as Nancy Cruzan,
the exercise of this right could be through a surrogate decision-
maker.2ol
However, states may still protect an incompetent individual
against abuse "through the imposition of heightened evidentiary
192. H.B. 1407, 2005-2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2005).
193. See AM. MED. Assoc., supra note 24 (describing the Association's position as
stated in its Code of Ethics).
194. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(a) (2006).
195. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(b) (2006).
196. 48 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. 136 (1979).
197. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990).
198. Id. at 278.
199. Id. at 281.
200. Id. at 279 n.7.
201. Id. at 280.
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requirements" to ensure that cessation of medical interventions would
be in the person's best interests.2 °2 The Cruzan decision supported
the Planned Parenthood v. Casey holding that "a State's interest in the
protection of life falls short of justifying any plenary override of indi-
vidual liberty claims." 20 3
Since Cruzan, the Supreme Court has been asked to extend the
right to die by allowing terminally ill individuals to choose assisted
suicide, but it declined to extend its holding in two 1997 cases, Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg204 and Vacco v. Quill. 20 5 However, in neither case
did the Court proscribe assisted suicide; it only proclaimed that a
state's prohibition of it was not unconstitutional.20 6 States were thus
not prohibited from explicitly allowing assisted suicide,20 7 as Oregon
had done in 1995 with its Death with Dignity Act.20 8
II. NORTH CAROLINA LAW
A. The Right to a Natural Death
Even before Cruzan declared that the "right to die" by refusing life-
sustaining treatment was protected by the Constitution, North Caro-
lina recognized an individual's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.
The General Assembly established in 1977 that "as a matter of public
policy .. .an individual's rights include the right to a peaceful and
natural death .... "209 An individual or his representative 210 may exer-
cise this right when the individual is diagnosed as "terminal and incur-
able" or in a "persistent vegetative state. 211
202. Id. at 281.
203. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 835 (1992) (discussing that this
view of life had been echoed in the Court's decisions following Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973)).
204. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997) (deciding "whether the
'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit
suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so").
205. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (deciding the question of whether New
York's ban on assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
206. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.
207. Id. at 788 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
208. OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800 to 127.897 (West 2006).
209. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-320(a) (2006) (allowing for a "natural death"); but cf.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-320(b) (2006) (prohibiting deliberate actions that directly lead to
the end of life, as in assisted suicide).
210. Id.
211. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(b)(1) (2006).
786 [Vol. 29:761
26
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 8
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol29/iss3/8
2007] POST-CONCEPTION PRENATAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 787
The North Carolina Legislature was prompted to codify the right
to a natural death by the New Jersey case In re Quinlan,212 in which a
father sought guardianship of his adult daughter who was in a persis-
tent vegetative state in order to terminate all extraordinary life-sus-
taining measures.2" 3 The Quinlan court held that the father, as
guardian, was entitled to act on his daughter's behalf and terminate all
extraordinary measures if her doctors concluded that she was likely to
never emerge from her comatose state.214
The public policy behind the law recognizes that for some people,
life is not preferable to death in certain situations. This proposition
clearly supports the North Carolina Court of Appeals's holding in
Azzolino; the court was "unwilling, and indeed, unable to say as a mat-
ter of law that life even with the most severe and debilitating of impair-
ments is always preferable to nonexistence.121 5 Reversing the decision,
the North Carolina Supreme Court held, contrary to North Carolina's
public policy, that "life, even life with severe defects, cannot be an
injury in the legal sense. '216
This public policy is also reflected in other laws. An individual
may appoint an agent who may exercise the principal's right to termi-
nate medical treatment under the health care power of attorney stat-
utes.21 7 Similarly, a guardian may be appointed in order to ensure an
incompetent individual can exercise his rights, including the right to a
natural death.218
The North Carolina General Assembly also recognized "as a mat-
ter of public policy the fundamental right of an individual to control
the decisions relating to his or her medical care, and that this right
may be exercised on behalf of the individual by an agent chosen by the
individual."219 Medical care includes prenatal care and abortions.
Thus, North Carolina recognizes it is a woman's fundamental right to
control decisions relating to her pregnancy and its termination.
212. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ. 1976).
213. Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. 1995 WL 321858.
214. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 671-72.
215. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 322 S.E. 2d, 567, 576 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
216. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 532 (N.C. 1985).
217. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32A-15, 19, 25 to 26 (2006) (delineating powers of
health care attorney-in-fact).
218. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35A-1201 (2006) (stating a guardian may exercise the
personal rights of an individual).
219. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-15(a) (2006); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-15(b)
(2006) ("The purpose of this article is to establish an additional, nonexclusive method
for an individual to exercise his or her right to give, withhold, or withdraw consent to
medical treatment .... ).
27
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B. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
As North Carolina courts have recognized, "to state a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege that
(1) the defendant negligently engaged in conduct, (2) it was reasona-
bly foreseeable that such conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emo-
tional distress, and (3) the conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff severe
emotional distress. '' 220 Additionally, "a plaintiff may recover for his or
her severe emotional distress arising due to concern for another per-
son, if the plaintiff can prove that he or she has suffered such severe
emotional distress as a proximate and foreseeable result of the defen-
dant's negligence."
2 2 1
By recognizing an action for the negligent infliction of emotional
distress after the live birth of a child with birth defects, our supreme
court took a step closer to permitting wrongful birth claims. While the
McAllister court purportedly did not overrule Azzolino, its holding
does not harmonize with the Azzolino rule that life can never constitute
an injury at law.
The Azzolino rule resulted only from the court's struggle with the
"thorny moral, philosophical, and theological questions" it saw in the
222 thwrongful birth claim, as the court recognized that jurisdictions
allowing wrongful birth claims were attempting to address a valid
problem.223 As a result of Azzolino and McAllister, our courts are now
allowing parents to recover for subjective emotional distress over the
fact that their child has birth defects, while inexplicably prohibiting
them from recovering for the objective financial harm that resulted
from negligent medical care. These two rulings must be reconciled by
the legislature to allow equitable recovery for post-conception prenatal
negligence.
C. Medical Malpractice
The current statutes reflect the state's desire to minimize medical
malpractice suits, containing stringent requirements for expert certifi-
cation to support a plaintiffs claim to avoid dismissal. 24 After this
initial hurdle, a medical malpractice claim must sufficiently allege "(1)
220. McAllister v. Ha, 496 S.E.2d 577, 582-83 (N.C. 1998).
221. Id. at 583.
222. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 537 (N.C. 1985) (Exum, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 536.
224. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j) (2006) (stating the pleading must
specifically assert that the medical care has been reviewed by an expert who is willing
to testify that the medical care did not comply with the applicable standard of care
unless pleading establishes negligence under res ipsa loquitur).
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the applicable standard of care; (2) a breach of such standard of care
by the defendant; (3) the injuries suffered by the plaintiff were proxi-
mately caused by such breach; and (4) the damages resulting to the
plaintiff.'' 225 In addition, there is a four-year statute of limitation for
non-apparent injuries and a ten-year period when foreign objects have
been left inside a patient. 2 6 These limitations are "consistent with the
purpose and spirit of the medical malpractice act, that is, to decrease
the number and severity of medical malpractice claims in an effort to
decrease the cost of medical malpractice insurance. 22 7
Medical malpractice claims alleging lack of informed consent are
governed by statute, which prohibits claims where: (1) the action of
the health care provider met the required standards of practice when
consent was obtained from the patient; and (2) a reasonable person
would have a general understanding of the proposed treatment and
risks involved based on the information given by the health care pro-
vider; or (3) a reasonable person would have then undergone the pro-
posed medical care had she been advised according to (1) and (2).228
This provision for informed consent is in accordance with the standard
for all medical malpractice actions, which requires the plaintiff to
prove the physician acted outside "the standards of practice among
members of the same health care profession with similar training and
experience situated in the same or similar communities at the time of
the alleged act giving rise to the cause of action. 229
PUBLIC POLICY AND OTHER CONCERNS
I. THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DEBATE
North Carolina has a legitimate interest in reducing the number of
frivolous medical malpractice lawsuits.2 30 There is, however, an ongo-
ing debate as to whether an overabundance of such claims even
exists. 3 1 The Medical Mutual Insurance Company argues it is the
225. Purvis v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. Serv. Corp., 624 S.E.2d 380, 383 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2006) (citing Weatherford v. Glassman, 500 S.E.2d 466, 468 (N.C. Ct. App.
1998)).
226. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (2006) (establishing one-year period to commence
action from time of discovery).
227. Black v. Littlejohn, 325 S.E.2d 469, 475 (N.C. 1985).
228. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13 (2006).
229. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (2006).
230. Preston v. Thompson, 280 S.E.2d 780, 784 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
231. Burton Craige, The Medical Malpractice "Crisis": Myth and Reality, N.C. ST. BAR
J., Summer 2004, at 8 (arguing the drive to reform medical malpractice is based on
"myths, none of which have any basis in reality").
789
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high cost of litigation that has increased medical malpractice insur-
ance rates and has driven up the cost of health care.232 On the other
hand, the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers ("NCATL") argues
that a recent study 233 disproves the notion that the system is overrun
with frivolous litigation.234 A report by NCATL on the medical mal-
practice statistics kept by the Administrative Office of the Courts
revealed that only 0.3% of all civil cases were medical malpractice
suits.2 35 Contrary to the fears of malpractice insurers, the growth in
the number of physicians in North Carolina has outpaced the growth
of the general population, proving that litigation is not driving health
care providers from the state.236
North Carolina recognizes wrongful conception as a medical mal-
practice claim. 237 There is no indication that this recognition has cre-
ated a burden on either the legal system or the medical profession. The
North Carolina Medical Board acknowledges a physician's obligation
to always provide ethical medical care to patients:
Having assumed care of a patient, the physician may not neglect that
patient nor fail for any reason to prescribe the full care that patient
requires in accord with the standards of acceptable medical practice...
Therefore, it is the position of the North Carolina Medical Board that
any act by a physician that violates or may violate the trust a patient
places in the physician places the relationship between physician and
patient at risk....
The Board believes the interests and health of the people of North Car-
olina are best served when the physician-patient relationship, founded
on patient trust, is considered sacred, and when the elements crucial to
that relationship and to that trust-communication, patient primacy,
confidentiality, competence, patient autonomy, compassion, selfless-
232. David P. Sousa, N.C. Medical Malpractice Insurance Data v. Plaintiffs' Attorneys,
Can Fact Prevail Over Fiction?, 64 N.C. MED. J. 182, 184 (2003).
233. David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024 (2006).
234. Press Release, N.C. Acad. Trial Law., New. Study Finds "Frivolous" Litigation
Unlikely in Medical Malpractice Lawsuits (May 12, 2006), available at http://
www.ncatl.org/file depot/0-10000000/0-10000/9208/folder/51285/5.12.06.pdf.
235. N.C. ACAD. TRIAL LAW., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAWSUITS IN NORTH CAROLINA,
1998-2005 (2006), available at http://ncatl.org/file depot/0-10000000/0-10000/92
08/folder/18824/MedMalReportO6.
236. Id.
237. McAllister v. Ha, 496 S.E.2d 577 (N.C. 1998); Jackson v. Bumgardner, 347
S.E.2d 743 (N.C. 1986).
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ness, appropriate care-are foremost in the hearts, minds, and actions
of the physicians licensed by the Board.238
These guidelines also instruct that the physician is to have adequate
communication with his patients and to have no conflicts of interest,
as trust between physician and patient is fundamental.23 9 Thus, the
Medical Board itself recognizes that the negligent failure to communi-
cate screening results is wrong. However, disciplinary action by the
Board against a negligent physician is insufficient compensation for
the parents faced with the exorbitant cost of health care for a disabled
child. There must be legal recourse to recover for the financial harm
created by a physician's post-conception prenatal negligence.
II. EUGENIC ABORTIONS
To many critics, genetic screening represents the "Nazification of
medicine. '24" Routine prenatal care that incorporates genetic screen-
ing may be just a few steps away from widespread eugenics.241 With
the possibility of a genetically perfect child, parents would discard any-
thing less. 42
Medical advancements in genetic screening will continue regard-
less of whether courts allow claims for wrongful birth or wrongful life.
Prenatal screening will continue to become an integrated part of prena-
tal care, demanded by parents wanting to avoid having children with
birth defects.243 The courts cannot change parents' hopes and expec-
238. N.C. MED. BD., POSITION STATEMENT, THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP (Sept.
2006), available at http://www.ncmedboard.org/ (follow "For Physicians" hyperlink;
then follow "Board Position Statements" hyperlink).
239. Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 2 (stating that first trimester screening "should
be considered by those who want prenatal screening and diagnosis as early as
possible. However, they should understand that second-trimester screening remains
the standard of care. And while it is the health care provider's obligation to fully
inform the mother of her options, it is up to her to decide whether first-trimester
testing will be done.").
240. Health Warning Over "Nazi" Genetic Screening, BBC NEws, Aug. 9, 1999, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/415136.stm.
241. JOAN ROTHSCHILD, THE DREAM OF THE PERFECT CHILD 6-7, 62-64 (2005)
(discussing "reformed eugenics").
242. Id. at 6 ("I argue that the discourse of the perfect child, as it aggregates slowly,
will give rise to a health hierarchy of birth, setting criteria for the imperfect, and for the
nerfect. These criteria will be imbalanced economically, racially, ethnically, culturally,
and by gender.").
243. The March of Dimes supports the January 2007 recommendation from the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists that "every pregnant woman,
regardless of age, be offered an improved method of screening for Down syndrome"
that involves a blood test and a special ultrasound. See March of Dimes, Professionals'
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tations for healthy children by carving out an exception to medical
malpractice. Prohibiting claims does not encourage the acceptance of
children with birth defects; it only leaves women unprotected from the
negligence of their prenatal health care workers. The current stance
even holds physicians harmless for active attempts to withhold infor-
mation or medical procedures from patients in an effort to prevent
abortion.2 4 4 While the state does not have to encourage abortion,2 4 5 it
should not sanction fraudulent, unethical medical care.
Ill. DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
It is not surprising that people with disabilities could be offended
by claims entitled "wrongful birth" or "wrongful life." Some people
interpret the basis of the action as a statement that it would have been
better to have been aborted than born with a defect. 2 46 This implies
that the defect is the single most important aspect of the individual,
neglecting the holistic view of the person.247 Wendy Hensel argues
that allowing the claims will set back the entire disability rights move-
ment, as individuals will emphasize their unique situations to win
damages rather than unite in "the shared experience of stigmatiza-
tion. ' 24 1 Some courts, in refusing the claims, explain that allowing
them could be construed as "the state's view that a handicapped child
should not be deemed better off dead and of less value than a 'normal'
child. " 249
& Researchers' Quick References and Fact Sheets, http://www.marchofdimes.com/
professionals/143321214.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
244. See, e.g., Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 322 S.E.2d 567, 573-74 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)
("In response to a direct question from Mrs. Azzolino regarding the advisability of this
procedure, defendant . . . spoke of her own personal and religious prejudices, and
those of her husband, against the use of amniocentesis. She advised Mrs. Azzolino of
the medical risks associated with amniocentesis, without setting those risks in the
context of a complete risk-benefit analysis and thus unduly emphasized those risks.").
245. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (holding the states may "make a value
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion").
246. Brock, supra note 23, at 79; see also Tom Shakespeare, The Social Context of
Individual Choice, in QuAIT-Y OF LIFE AND HUMAN DIFFERENCE 217, 226 (David
Wasserman et al. eds., 2005) (discussing the "assumption that 'disability' makes life
not worth living, and that it would be better to be dead than disabled").
247. Wendy Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life
Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 141, 144, 146-47 (2005) (discussing the implicitly
discriminatory medical model of health followed in America by most practitioners).
248. Id. at 194-95.
249. Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 623 A.2d 816, 820 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1993); see also Hensel, supra note 247, at 176 ("Recovery in wrongful birth and
wrongful life suits, on the other hand, does not affirm the value of the plaintiffs life -
792 [Vol. 29:761
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It is true that allowing claims for wrongful birth and wrongful life
will signify that health is preferred over disabilities or defects. Ameri-
cans follow the "medical model" of health, in which the treatment and
prevention of illness is the goal, rather than the acceptance of what
some view as a mere difference.250 Accepting these claims as regular
medical malpractice claims and eliminating "wrongful" from the
vocabulary of such actions would be less patently insulting to people
with disabilities. The state cannot be so sensitive to the feelings of
some individuals with disabilities that it does not hold physicians lia-
ble for malpractice. For instance, it would be unthinkable to prohibit a
claim for malpractice where a physician negligently amputated a per-
son's limb, as people without limbs would be insulted that their physi-
cal condition could be considered an injury.
NORTH CAROLINA'S DuTY TO RESPECT AND PROTECT PARENTAL RIGHTS
North Carolina recognizes an individual's fundamental right to
control the course of his or her medical care251 but does not provide
legal recourse when a prenatal health care provider willfully or negli-
gently interferes with this right. The legislature must remedy North
Carolina's judicially-created policy of ambivalence toward prenatal
negligence. The North Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged in
McAllister,25 2 contrary to the policy it declared in Azzolino,25 3 that par-
ents were harmed by the birth of a child with defects and deserved to
pursue claims for the emotional distress resulting from the physician's
negligence.25 4 The court decisions addressing this area of medical
malpractice have resulted in conflicting outcomes, with hollow distinc-
instead, it negates it. This effect is most apparent in the wrongful life context, where
recovery turns on the jury's conclusion that life with impairments is objectively worse
than non-existence.").
250. Hensel, supra note 247, at 147.
251. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-15(a) (2006) ("The General Assembly recognizes as a
matter of public policy the fundamental right of an individual to control the decisions
relating to his or her medical care, and that this right may be exercised on behalf of the
individual by an agent chosen by the individual.").
252. McAllister v. Ha, 496 S.E.2d 577 (N.C. 1998).
253. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 532 (N.C. 1985) (holding "life, even
life with severe defects, cannot be an injury in the legal sense").
254. McAllister, 496 S.E.2d at 583 ("Plaintiffs alleged that defendant's negligence
caused them 'extreme mental and emotional distress,' specifically referring to plaintiff-
wife's fears regarding her son's health and her resultant sleeplessness .... [Pilaintiffs'
allegations here, while sparse, are sufficient to state a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.").
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tions made between pre-conception and post-conception negligence 255
and between emotional and financial damages.256
At present, Maine is the only state with a statute specifically
allowing wrongful birth and wrongful life claims following the birth of
a child with defects.257 It first declares that "the birth of a normal,
healthy child does not constitute a legally recognizable injury and that
it is contrary to public policy to award damages for the birth or rearing
of a healthy child. ' 25 8 Thus, claims for damages following the birth of
a healthy child are prohibited. 59 Wrongful birth and wrongful life
claims following the birth of an "unhealthy child" are allowed, but
damages are limited to expenses "associated with the disease, defect or
handicap suffered by the child."2 60 Finally, the statute clarifies that
traditional medical malpractice claims related to injuries to or the
death of the mother or fetus are not precluded by its language.2 6'
The North Carolina supreme court recommended such a statute
several times in Azzolino as the best way for parents to pursue claims
for post-conception negligence.262 Thus, the legislature should amend
the medical malpractice statute to allow actions for medical malprac-
tice based on the prenatal, post-conception negligence of a health care
provider without using the terms wrongful birth or wrongful life.
These malpractice claims could be based on lack of informed consent
or negligence and would specifically provide a method for the plaintiff,
whether the parents or the child, to recover for the extraordinary costs
of necessary medical care and support for the child.
Unlike Maine's statute, a further limitation should be made in
order to maintain North Carolina's respect for people with disabilities
and to guard against frivolous lawsuits. North Carolina recognizes
that individuals with terminal and incurable illnesses may decide that
255. See Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 852 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1988) (allowing claim for
pre-conception negligence even though parents wanted to become pregnant with a
healthy child).
256. Compare McAllister, 496 S.E.2d 577 (allowing claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress), with Azzolino, 337 S.E.2d 528 (prohibiting damages for economic
injury).
257. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (2006).
258. § 2931(1).
259. § 2931(2) (allowing exception for damages following a "failed sterilization
procedure," but damages are limited to medical expenses, pain and suffering, and loss
of earnings related to pregnancy).
260. § 2931(3).
261. § 2931(4).
262. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 537 (N.C. 1985).
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death is preferable to life.26 3 While some people may assert they
would not want to live with a disability, our statutes clearly differenti-
ate a disability from a terminal condition. Thus, this medical malprac-
tice action should only be available to families and children born with
conditions that a physician has diagnosed as terminal and incurable.
This limitation would allow parents or children to recover for the
most devastating illnesses, such as Tay-Sachs disease, anencephaly, or
Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, while preventing claims for conditions where
individuals may live fulfilling, rewarding lives. Only if a child is born
with such a severe defect that a physician could diagnose it as fatal
would the family be able to pursue legal remedies. The family would
also need to prove that it conveyed to the physician that in the event a
severe defect was detected, the mother would terminate the pregnancy.
Like North Carolina, Maine legislators were concerned with esca-
lating medical malpractice litigation; the purpose of the statute was to
limit such claims.264 Yet, Maine properly found a way to both limit
claims and ensure that true victims of medical malpractice had legal
recourse for the resulting extraordinary costs of health care.
Maine did not define "unhealthy child" for legal purposes.2 65
This leaves the statute available to all persons claiming damage from
the birth of a subjectively abnormal child. Critics of these statute-
based claims would still fear the slippery slope. Claims for superficial
traits of the child would soon follow claims for true birth defects. 266
Disability rights advocates would find flaws not only with recognizing
disability as an injury but also with the language that implies disabled
people are not considered normal.267
In its opinion denying claims for wrongful birth and wrongful life,
the North Carolina Supreme Court expressed its fears that physicians
would be subject to seemingly endless liability based on parents'
fraudulent claims or capricious judgments about defects.266 The court
could foresee lawsuits over children born the "wrong" gender or as
263. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-320 (2006).
264. Musk v. Nelson, 647 A.2d 1198, 1200-01 (Me. 1994) (interpreting legislative
effort to "repudiate[ I certain types of actions" and limit damages for other actions by
statute).
265. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931(3).
266. See, e.g., Azzolino, 337 S.E.2d 528, 535 ("When will parents in those
jurisdictions be allowed to decide that their child is so "defective" that given a chance
they would have aborted it while still a fetus and, as a result, then be allowed to hold
their physician civilly liable?").
267. See Bernstein, supra note 47, at 321 (arguing that allowing claims sends a
message that "the state places a higher value on its 'normal' citizens").
268. Azzolino, 337 S.E.2d at 535.
795
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healthy carriers of a "deleterious gene. ' '26 9 A statute limiting the
acceptable causes of action would ensure the Azzolino court's fears
would not be realized. 2
70
The proposed statute would not be as broad as Maine's statute-it
would compensate parents or children for the medical expenses and
other financial burdens associated with the child's terminal illness.
Only those parents who sought genetic screening and shared their
intent to abort a fetus found to have fatal defects could claim they were
deprived of the option to terminate the pregnancy.
While North Carolina statutes do not force physicians or nurses
"to perform or participate in medical procedures which result in an
abortion" if they object on religious, ethical, or moral grounds,27 '
those providers still have a duty of care to their patients and should
not be allowed to commit medical malpractice based on any personal
objection. If providers have an objection to a specific case, it is their
duty to remove themselves from that patient's case in a manner that
assures continuity of care.272 Our statutes must recognize, as the med-
ical profession itself does, that medical malpractice is never
acceptable.
CONCLUSION
The future of prenatal medical technology is fast approaching, as
scientists have more options among methods of diagnosis and are
refining prenatal surgery.273 The most advanced prenatal treatment is
not yet widely available or reliable, and until it is, most parents are left
with pregnancy termination as the only alternative to bearing a child
with severe birth defects. It is time for North Carolina to acknowledge
that prenatal, post-conception care is an increasingly routine medical
specialty and allow parents and children to sue for malpractice if it
occurs.
269. Id.
270. Id. (discussing the possibility of lawsuits for children born the wrong gender or
as carriers of defective genes).
271. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(e) (2006).
272. N.C. MED. BD., POSITION STATEMENT, THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP (Sept.
2006), available at http://www.ncmedboard.org/ (follow "For Physicians" hyperlink;
then follow "Board Position Statements" hyperlink) ("IT]ermination of the physician-
patient relationship must be done in compliance with the physician's obligation to
support continuity of care for the patient.").
273. See generally Aris Antsaklis, Fetal Surgery: New Developments, 4 ULTRASOUND
REV. OBSTET. & GYN. 245 (2004) (discussing cases in which prenatal surgery is now
the best option to correct defects).
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Our courts have already taken one step closer to the majority of
other jurisdictions that recognize these claims, but this has resulted in
an inequitable distribution of damages to parents who claim to be
emotionally injured. There must also be recourse for those families
who have emotionally accepted the child's condition but who need to
be compensated for the financial injuries the physician's negligence
caused. Maine's statute is a good starting point, but adjusting it to
further limit claims only for fatal and incurable defects will balance
North Carolina's public policy to respect life, while protecting the
rights of parents who would have chosen to spare their child the pain
of a terminal existence.
Michelle McEntire
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